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The Two Hindenburg Elections of 1925 and 1932:  
A Total Reversal of Voter Coalitions [1990] 
Jürgen W. Falter ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Hindenburg-Wahlen von 1925 und 1932: Eine vollständige Um-
kehrung der Wähler-Koalitionen«. This article compares the two presidential 
elections of 1925 and 1932 in an attempt to determine the shifts between 
these two elections which brought Paul von Hindenburg to power. Although 
this article does not attempt to add to the historiography of Hindenburg’s elec-
tion and the subsequent deparliamentarization which has often been thought 
by historians to have eased Hitler’s transition to power, it attempts to use sta-
tistical verification to underline a number of hypotheses generally agreed upon 
by historians, but which lack substantial evidence. In considering Hindenburg’s 
election, a number of variables are considered, such as: which parties the Hin-
denburg voters came from, why Hindenburg was backed rather than his oppo-
sitional candidate Wilhelm Marx, and what social background the Hindenburg 
voters had. Also, the commonly held belief that many of the communist voters 
fluctuated from the communist party candidate, Ernst Thälmann, to Adolf Hit-
ler is statistically analyzed. 
Keywords: Hindenburg, deparliamentarization, Weimar Republic. 
1.  Introductory Remarks 
The two Weimar presidential elections of March and April, 1925 and 1932, are 
among the most fascinating and historically significant elections of modern 
German history (see Table 1). They are fascinating for the electoral historian 
and the generalist alike because of the virtually total reversal between 1925 and 
1932 of the voting coalitions that backed and brought to power the aged Field 
Marshal Paul von Hindenburg. And they are historically extremely significant 
because it was von Hindenburg who at least encouraged if not sustained the 
creeping process of deparliamentarization after 1930, a process that finally 
brought Hitler into power. It may be readily speculated that another president, 
e.g., Wilhelm Marx, who as the candidate of the Weimar coalition parties was 
Hindenburg’s chief opponent in 1925, would not so easily have dismissed 
Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning in May of 1932. And Marx undoubtedly 
                                                             
∗  Reprint of: Falter, Jürgen W. 1990. The Two Hindenburg Elections of 1925 and 1932: A Total 
Reversal of Voter Coalitions. Central European History 23, 225-41. 
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would not have appointed the right-wing Center party dissident, Franz von 
Papen, as Brüning’s successor. 
Astonishingly, these two really important Weimar elections have yet to be 
adequately investigated by electoral historians. An analysis of these elections 
therefore virtually has to start from scratch. The outcome does not, perhaps, 
necessarily add something new to what has been assumed by historians about 
the two Hindenburg elections. The significance of the following analysis lies 
more in the fact that it provides statistical confirmation for some more or less 
commonly held but never sufficiently corroborated hypotheses. In the follow-
ing, I will turn first to the 1925 election in order to find out where – i.e., what 
parties – the Hindenburg voters came from, and what role was played by the 
decision of the Catholic Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) to back Hindenburg 
instead of the candidate of the Catholic Center Party, Wilhelm Marx. Then I 
will examine the transition from 1925 to 1932. I will ask what statistical rela-
tions may be observed between these two elections and, from a complementary 
perspective, what social groups supported Hindenburg in 1925 and 1932, re-
spectively. In a third and final step I will try to find out if there really was a 
significant voter fluctuation between the Communist candidate Ernst Thälmann 
and Adolf Hitler from the first to the second ballot of 1932, as is so often al-
leged in contemporary and historical analyses of the collapse of the Weimar 
Republic.  
2.  From what Parties did the 1925 Hindenburg Voters 
Come, and to what Parties did they go in Subsequent 
Elections?  
Of course this question cannot be answered directly or beyond any reasonable 
doubt, since we do not have any methodologically reliable and representative 
opinion polls for the Weimar period. What we can do, however, is to look first 
at the statistical relationship between the Hindenburg vote and the vote of other 
parties and candidates at the level of the 1,200 German counties and cities of 
that period. The results are statistically sound if we restrict the verbal interpre-
tation of our findings to the territorial, that is, the county, level. Since we are, 
however, much more interested in individual-level relationships, I will try, in a 
second – statistically somewhat risky – step, to discern the underlying (but 
unknown) “true” voting transitions to and from Hindenburg by means of multi-
ple ecological regression analysis.1 
                                                             
1  This analytical tool was first proposed by the German statistician Fritz Bernstein (“Über eine 
Methode, die soziologische und bevölkerungsstatistische Gliederung von Abstimmungen bei 
geheimen Wahlverfahren statistisch zu ermitteln,” Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv 22 
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2.1  Some Party-Vote Correlations of the 1925 Hindenburg Vote 
Table 2 presents two statistically more or less equivalent pieces of information: 
percentage distributions and correlation coefficients. Since percentage distribu-
tions may be more readily understood by most historians, I will concentrate on 
the former. In order to get an idea at the county level of how the Hindenburg 
vote of 1925 corresponds to the strength of other parties and candidates, the 
approximately 1,200 counties of Weimar Germany (regrouped into 831 county 
units in order to cope with numerous administrative boundary changes)2 are 
split up into quintiles according to the strength of the 1925 Hindenburg vote.  
Table 1: Results of the Two Weimar Presidential Elections of 1925 and 1932 
 
1925 1932 
1st Ballot 2nd Ballot 1st Ballot 2nd Ballot 
Jarres·(Nationalist) 38.8 - - - 
Held (Bavarian Cath.)  3.7 - - - 
Ludendorff (Völkisch)  1.1 - - - 
Braun (Social Dem.) 29.0 - - - 
Marx (Center Party) 14.5 45.3 - - 
Hellpach (Left Lib.)  5.8 - - - 
Thälmann (Communist) 7.0  6.4 13.2 10.2 
Hindenburg - 48.3 49.5 53.0 
Duesterberg (National.) - -  6.8 - 
Hitler (Nation. Soc.) - - 30.1 36.8 
Winter (Right Lib.) - -  0.3 - 
Other  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Turnout 68.9 77.6 86.2 83.5 
Cell entries: percent of valid vote. 
 
We thus get five categories with an equal number of counties in each. For each 
category we assess the percentage of voters won by other parties or candidates 
than Hindenburg in a series of elections between December 1924 and July 
                                                                                                                                
[1932]: 253-6). It was reinvented some 20 years later by Leo A. Goodman, “Ecological Re-
gressions and the Behavior of Individuals,” American Sociological Review 43 (1953): 557-72. 
For a comparison of the two versions of ecological regression see Jan-Bernd Lohmöller and 
Jürgen W. Falter. “Some Further Aspects of Ecological Regression Analysis,” Quality and 
Quantity 20 (1986): 109-25. Still one of the best introductions to ecological regression 
analysis for historians is an article by Morgan Kousser, “Ecological Regression and the 
Analysis of Past Politics,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 4 (1973/74): 237-62. 
2  For some formal aspects of this data set which contains about 1,200 cases and more than 
700 variables see Dirk Hänisch, “Inhalt und Struktur der Datenbank ‘Wahl- und Sozialdaten 
der Kreise und Gemeinden des Deutschen Reiches von 1920-1933,’” Historical Social Re-
search 14 (1989) 1: 39-67. The ICPSR data set on Weimar elections unfortunately has some 
serious shortcomings which make it not advisable to use it without major revisions. See Jür-
gen W. Falter and Wolf D. Gruner, “Minor and Major Flaws of a Widely Used Data Set: The 
ICPSR ‘German Weimar Republic Data 1919-1933’ under Scrutiny,” Historical Social Re-
search 6 (1981) 4: 1-26. 
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1932. If there is a low percentage of votes for the other parties and candidates 
in the first quintile (where the Hindenburg vote was lowest) and a growing 
percentage of votes in the following quintiles (where Hindenburg fared better), 
we have a positive statistical relationship between the two votes.  
Table 2:  Some Party-Vote Correlates of the 1925 Hindenburg Vote 
Party Hindenburg Vote (Quintiles)  
Vote 1 2 3 4 5 All R 
Dec. 1924        
Nationalists  6.5 12.7 16.5 21.3 32.4 16.2  .76 
Nat.-Socialists  0.7  1.7  2.8  4.1  4.6  2.4  .55 
Right Liberal  4.9  8.1  9.6  9.5  7.0  8.0  .22 
Left Liberal  3.7  5.8  5.9  4.6  3.4  5.0  .02 
Splinter Parties  4.5  5.5  7.1  5.3  7.7  5.9  .13 
First Ballot 1925        
Jarres (DVP/DNVP) 11.8 22.4 30.2 35.1 45.5 26.6  .87 
Held (Bav. Cath.)  1.6  2.8  3.2  3.2  1.8  2.6  .03 
Ludendorff (Völk)  0.4  0.6  0.7  1.8  1.0  0.7  .27 
Braun (SPD) 14.5 20.7 25.0 22.4 15.6 19.9  .20 
Marx (Cath.) 27.7  9.5  3.2  1.9  2.2  9.9 -.69 
Hellpach (DDP)  3.2  5.0  4.8  3.3  2.3  4.0 -.04 
Thälmann (Comm.)  5.1  6.2  4.4  4.0  1.9  4.8 -.21 
Nonvoters 35.7 32.6 28.5 28.9 29.7 31.1  .19 
May 1928        
Nationalists  5.0  8.5 10.3 12.9 23.6 10.8  .63 
Nat.-Socialists  0.9  1.8  2.1  3.1  2.6  2.0  .29 
Right Liberal  4.4  6.8  7.7  7.7  5.6  6.6  .19 
Left Liberal  2.6  4.3  4.3  3.4  2.7  3.7  .06 
Splinter Parties  7.9  9.1 11.8 11.8 14.2 10.6  .27 
September 1930         
Nationalists  3.4  4.8  5.2  6.7 11.9  5.7  .47 
Nat.-Socialists  9.3 13.9 16.1 18.6 20.3 15.0  .63 
Right Liberal  2.6  4.1  4.2  4.2  2.9  3.9  .10 
Left Liberal  2.6  3.5  3.8  2.8  2.2  3.2 -.00 
Splinter Parties  8.0  9.1 11.8 11.8 14.2 11.3  .37 
Second Ballot 1932        
Hindenburg 51.9 45.2 43.2 40.3 32.2  8.6 -.59 
Hitler 18.9 27.4 33.7 36.8 45.6 30.9  .82 
Thälmann  9.6 10.2  8.1  6.9  3.9 44.5 -.29 
July 1932        
Nationalists  3.0  4.2  4.9  6.3  8.7  5.2  .57 
Nat.-Socialists 18.7 28.3 34.9 37.7 45.4 31.4  .79 
Right Liberal  0.7  1.1  1.2  1.1  0.8  1.0  .10 
Left Liberal  0.5  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.5  0.8 0.4 
Splinter Parties  2.2  2.7  2.9  2.1  2.9  1.7  .05 
Cell entries: percent of total electorate (eligible voters). Nationalists: DNVP; Nat.-Socialists: 
NSDAP (1924: NSFB); Right Liberal: DVP; Left Liberal: DDP (1932: DStP). 
Reading example: In July 1932 the NSDAP share of the electorate was 18.7% in the first 
quintile, i.e. those 20 percent of the 831 county units where the 1925 Hindenburg vote was 
lowest; in the fifth quintile (i.e. where the Hindenburg vote was highest) the 1932 Nazi vote 
was 45.4 percent. 
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The correlation coefficient therefore is positive in sign and rather high in mag-
nitude. This is the case for the statistical association between the Hindenburg 
vote on the one hand, and the vote for the German National Party (DNVP) or 
the völkisch-Nazi coalition in the late-1924 parliamentary elections. A positive 
correlation also exists between the Hindenburg vote and the vote for the joint 
presidential candidate of the DNVP and the right-liberal DVP on the first ballot 
of 1925, Karl Jarres. In other words, the higher the Hindenburg vote of 1925 
was in a county, the higher, on the average, the DNVP or Jarres vote was in 
that same county. The opposite applies to candidates who won relatively more 
votes in the first than in the subsequent Hindenburg quintiles, as is the case 
with Wilhelm Marx, his close competitor of 1925. The correlation coefficient 
still is comparatively high, but now of course negative in sign. 
We thus find out that German Nationalists and the 1924 coalition of völk-
isch and national-socialist splinters, as well as Jarres, displayed the same distri-
bution of votes as Hindenburg did: they fared much better, on the average, in 
counties where Hindenburg was strong than in counties where Hindenburg was 
weak. For example, in the 165 counties of the first quintile, the Jarres vote 
amounted to not more than 11.8 percent of the electorate, while in the fifth 
quintile, the Jarres vote was up to 45.5 percent. In addition, there is a slight, 
curvilinear relationship between the Hindenburg vote and each of the follow-
ing: turnout; the vote for the first-ballot candidate of the völkisch Right, Erich 
von Ludendorff; and, quite unexpectedly, the vote for the first ballot presiden-
tial candidate of the Social Democrats, Otto Braun. 
2.2  Some Ecological Regression Estimates of the “True” Voter 
 Fluctuations to and from Paul von Hindenburg in 1925 
It would be quite hazardous to interpret these findings in terms of individual or 
group relationships – to assume, that is, that all or most Hindenburg voters 
were necessarily former Jarres and DNVP voters. So-called ecological falla-
cies, such as the erroneous assumption that the relationships of one level of 
analysis would be equivalent to the other, could (but by no means necessarily 
must) result from such a tacit assumption of congruence.3 To get somewhat 
better estimates of voter fluctuations, one has to take into consideration the 
development of the other parties or candidates as well. This is done by multiple 
ecological regression analysis – a powerful but somewhat dangerous statistical 
technique that bases its estimates on rather “strong” distributional premises 
such as linearity, non-contextuality of relationships, etc. Only if these premises 
                                                             
3  See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., “A Typology of Ecological Fallacies,” in Mattei Dogan and Stein 
Rokkan, eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass., 
1969), 69-86. W. S. Robinson, “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,” 
American Sociological Review 40 (1950): 351-7. 
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are met by the data (which we cannot fully know) can the estimates of ecologi-
cal regression equations be interpreted as “true” individual level fluctuations. If 
not, they still represent a good aggregate level estimate of the statistical rela-
tionship between the development of the Hindenburg vote and the vote for 
other parties and candidates. Since we cannot completely know if all assump-
tions of the method are really met, we should restrict our interpretation of the 
findings to differences of magnitude.4 
Table 3: From what Parties did the Hindenburg Voters come, and to what 
Parties did they go? Some Results of Ecological Regression Analysis 
From/To RT24B/PR25B From 
PR25B/RT28 
To 
PR25B/RT30 
To 
PR32B/RT32A 
To 
NSFB/NSDAP 73  2 20 21 
DNVP 86 17  7  4 
DVP 74  7  4  1 
DDP 30  4  3  1 
Z/BVP 20  0  0 24 
SPD 13 29 25 21 
KPD 16  7  9 11 
Other 67 13 14  3 
Nonvoters 19 23 18 15 
Cell entries: Transition probabilities, estimated by multiple regression analysis; county level 
data. “From” = percentage of party electorate switching to Hindenburg; “To” = percentage of 
Hindenburg voters switching to one of the indicated parties. 
Abbreviations: RT = Reichstag election: PR = Presidential election; RT24B = Reichstag election 
December 1924; PR25B = Presidential Election, April 1925 (second ballot); RT28 = Reichstag 
election 1928; RT32A = Reichstag election, July 1932, etc. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 report some ecological regression estimates of the voter fluctua-
tions to and from Hindenburg. The cell entries represent percentages. The first 
column of numbers of Table 3 informs about the transition probability of the 
December 1924 Reichstag voters from the parties indicated at the left of the 
table to Hindenburg. According to these estimates, between three-quarters and 
four-fifths of all right-wing voters (i.e., NSFB, DNVP, DVP, and various splin-
ter parties) of December 1924 seem to have supported their joint second-ballot 
presidential candidate, Hindenburg. From the other parties and the nonvoters, 
only a rather insignificant minority seems to have voted for Hindenburg. The 
flux of voters from the various candidates of the first ballot to Hindenburg 
                                                             
4  To control for the effect of nonlinear, contextual influences in the following an extension 
of multiple ecological regression analysis with product variables is used. For details see Jan-
Bernd Lohmöller et al., “Unemployment and the Rise of National Socialism: Contradicting 
Results from Different Regional Aggregations,” in Peter Nijkamp, ed., Measuring the Un-
measurable (The Hague, 1985), 357-70. Also Jürgen W. Falter and Reinhard Zintl, “The Eco-
nomic Crisis of the 1930’s and the Nazi Vote: An Attempt at Explanation by Means of a Ra-
tional Choice Approach and Ecological Regression Analysis,” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 19 (1988): 55-85. 
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which is reported in the first column of Table 4 seems to follow the same pat-
tern: almost all of the Jarres supporters joined the Hindenburg camp in the 
second round, while almost no fluctuation existed between Braun and Marx on 
the one hand and von Hindenburg on the other. 
Table 4: Voter Fluctuations between the First and Second Ballot of the Two 
Presidential Elections of 1925 and 1932 
PR25A/PR25B 
To Hindenburg From 
PR25B/PR32A 
From Hindenburg To 
PR32A/PR32B 
To Hindenburg From 
Jarres 95 Duesterberg 12 Duesterberg 15 
  Hindenburg 20 Hindenburg 94 
Ludendorff 45 Hitler 52 Hitler  4 
Braun  4 Thälmann  5 Thälmann  5 
Marx  9 Winter  0 Winter 16 
Hellpach 22 Other  0 Other 45 
Thälmann 15 Nonvoting 10 Nonvoting 13 
Cell entries: Transition probabilities, estimated by multiple ecological regression analysis. 
Reading example: Almost 100 percent of the Jarres voters switched to Hindenburg during the 
second ballot of the 1925 presidential election; and about 50 percent of the 1925 Hindenburg 
voters seem to have voted for Adolf Hitler in the first ballot of the 1932 presidential election. 
2.3  Where Did the Hindenburg Voters go after 1925? 
Tables 2-4 also suggest where Hindenburg’s voters went after 1925. At the 
aggregate (that is, the county) level there is a rather strong positive relationship 
between the Hindenburg vote of 1925 and the later vote of the DNVP; there is 
also a much smaller but still positive relationship with the splinter parties in 
1928 and 1930 (which, in turn, were mainly defectors from the German Na-
tionalists).5 But already in the Reichstag election of 1930, the NSDAP clearly 
overtook the DNVP in statistical “closeness” to the Hindenburg vote of 1925. 
And the correlation between the Hindenburg vote of 1925 and the Hitler sec-
ond-ballot vote of 1932 (r = 0.82!) is among the highest encountered in the 
whole data set: indeed, in this ballot, Hitler got less than 19 percent of the 
electorate in that 20 percent of the counties where the 1925 Hindenburg vote 
was lowest, but gathered more than 45 percent in the highest quintile. The 
accompanying graph, a so-called scatterplot, strikingly illustrates the remarka-
bly close fit between the 1925 Hindenburg and the 1932 Hitler constituencies: 
where Hindenburg got many votes in 1925, Hitler tended to poll a significantly 
above-average vote in 1932, and where Hindenburg fared poorly in 1925, so 
did Hitler in 1932 (see Chart 1). 
                                                             
5  See Falter and Zintl, “The Economic Crisis of the 1930’s and the Nazi Vote,” also Jürgen W. 
Falter, “The National Socialist Mobilisation of New Voters: 1928-1933,” in Thomas Childers, 
ed., 1919-1933 (London, 1986), 202-31. 
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Chart 1: The Correlation between the 1925 and the 1932 Hindenburg Vote 
(County Data) 
 
If we assume for the moment that we can fully trust our ecological regression 
estimates, about every sixth Hindenburg voter of 1925 voted DNVP in 1928, 
and every fourth seems to have voted SPD. The latter result, which at first sight 
looks quite counterintuitive, was probably due to the influx of new voters into 
the SPD in 1928 – voters who, according to other ecological regression find-
ings, seem to have voted DNVP in 1924 (and consequently Hindenburg in 
1925) and probably defected to the Nazis after 1928. The current findings 
suggest that about 20 percent of former Hindenburg partisans voted for the 
Nazis in 1930 – a number that accounts for almost half of the NSDAP elec-
torate of that year. Other parties, with the quite plausible exception of the splin-
ter parties, were not able to gain substantial numbers of Hindenburg’s 1925 
voters. 
2.4   A Closer Look at the Contribution of Former Held and 
 Thälmann Voters to the Electoral Success of the  
Hindenburg Ticket 
In some accounts of the 1925 presidential election, Hindenburg’s second-ballot 
victory is attributed either to the refusal of the Communists to withdraw their 
candidate, Ernst Thälmann, or to the decision of the Catholic Center’s Bavarian 
sister party, the BVP, to support the arch-Prussian Protestant Hindenburg in-
stead of the Rhenish Catholic Marx. Either the KPD or the BVP is thus held 
responsible for taking away the approximately 500,000 swing votes that would 
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have assured victory to Wilhelm Marx. Putting the blame upon the Com-
munists seems to me a bit farfetched: given the explicit enmity of this party 
toward the Weimar “capitalist state,” it would have been completely unrealistic 
to expect the KPD to support the candidate of the Weimar system. On the other 
hand, the BVP’s decision to support Hindenburg instead of Marx may indeed 
have been crucial. It is therefore worthwhile to analyze how many votes the 
Bavarian party’s decision might have cost the candidate of the Weimar coali-
tion.  
Table 5: The Correlation of the Held Vote with the Hindenburg and Marx Vote 
in Bavaria 
 1924B BVP Vote (Quintiles)  1925A Held Vote (Quintiles) 
1st 
Ballot 1 2 3 4 5 r 
2nd 
Ballot 1 2 3 4 5 r 
Jarres 27 18  9  7  6 -74 Hindenburg 44 37 33 40 40 -09 
Marx  3  2  2  1  1 -10 Marx 32 26 20 16 16 -57 
Thälmann  3  2  1  1  1 -42 Thälmann  3  2  1  1  1 -53 
Nonvoting 35 42 51 50 48 47 Nonvoting 21 34 46 43 43 58 
Braun 23 15  9  8  5 -70        
Marx  3  2  2  1  1 -10        
Hellpach  3  2  1  1  1 -50        
Ludendorff  2  3  2  1  1 -48        
Held  4 16 25 32 37 92        
Cell entries: percent of electorate and Pearson correlation coefficients; county data, weighted 
by number of eligible voters. 
Reading example: In those 166 counties where the BVP (and Held) vote was higher only 6 
percent of the electorate voted for Jarres during the first ballot, but 40 percent voted for 
Hindenburg during the second ballot. 
 
In Bavaria, Hindenburg outpolled Marx by more than 15 percentage points, as 
compared to only 3 points in the Reich as a whole.6 Table 5 reports percentage 
distributions and correlation coefficients for Bavaria, while Table 6 displays 
transition probabilities. The effects of the BVP’s recommendation for Hinden-
burg are clearly discernible. On the first ballot, Jarres got only 6 percent of the 
eligible voters in that 20 percent of the Bavarian counties where the BVP vote 
of the previous December was highest; the overall correlation coefficient is 
rather strong and negative in sign (−0.74). By contrast, Hindenburg was able to 
collect 40 percent of the electorate in the heaviest BVP (and first-ballot Held) 
precincts. By the same token, Marx won many fewer votes here than might 
have been expected. Table 6 indicates that approximately 60 percent of the 
first-ballot Held partisans followed their party’s recommendation and voted for 
Hindenburg on the second ballot, compared to only about 20 percent who 
                                                             
6  Regional results in Jürgen W. Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer 
Republik: Materialien zum Wahlverhalten 1919-1933 (Munich, 1986), 46, 73-79. 
HSR Suppl. 25 (2013)  │  226 
switched to Marx. This would indeed imply that about half a million votes 
could be attributed to the BVP’s unfortunate recommendation. In the light of 
Hindenburg’s past political record, the BVP’s electoral policy may be charac-
terized as shortsighted if not frivolous. 
Table 6:  Voting Transitions in Bavaria from the 1st to the 2nd Ballot of the 
1925 Reichspräsident Elections (Ecological Regression Estimates) 
First Ballot Second Ballot Nonvoting All First Ballot 
 Hindenburg Marx   
Jarres 85 13  0 15.5 
Held 60 22 16 19.8 
Braun 10 68 20 13.5 
Marx 33 40 24  1.7 
Nonvoting 21 13 64 43.9 
All Second Ballot 38.9 23.5 35.7  
Cell entries: Transition probabilities estimated by multiple ecological regression analysis; 
county data. 
Reading example: about 60 percent of the first ballot Held voters seem to have voted in favor 
of Hindenburg at the second ballot, and only about 22 percent for the Catholic Center candi-
date Marx. 
Last column: percent of valid votes won by Jarres, Held, etc. in the first ballot of the 1925 
Presidential elections; last row: percent of valid votes won by Hindenburg and Marx in the 
second ballot of the 1925 Presidential elections. 
3.  The 1932 Hindenburg Election 
It is well known that Hindenburg’s presidential record was far better until 
1930, or even March 1932, than many liberal and socialist commentators had 
expected. In 1932, the Weimar coalition parties even regarded the Field Mar-
shal as the only chance to keep Hitler and the NSDAP from power. Thus, at the 
age of 85, much against his own intention (he would have preferred either to 
head a right-wing ticket or to be the “non-political” candidate of the whole 
people), Hindenburg changed political camps in regard to the political parties 
supporting him.7 It is interesting to explore the voters’ reactions to this change 
of coalitions and to investigate the parallels and differences between the Hin-
denburg electorates of 1925 and 1932. 
                                                             
7  See Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem 
des Machtzerfalls in der Demokratie (Villingen, 1955), 443-80. 
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Chart 2: The 1925 Hindenburg Vote and the 1932 Hitler Vote (County Level 
Data) 
 
Another look at Table 2 shows that Hindenburg’s electoral success in 1932 was 
highest in those counties where he was least successful in 1925. Hitler, on the 
other hand, was able to draw much more electoral support in the old Hinden-
burg strongholds than Hindenburg himself (see also Chart 2). If the transition 
probabilities in Table 4 are indeed unbiased, Hitler was able to get the support 
on the first ballot of about 50 percent of the 1925 Hindenburg voters (and about 
60 percent on the second ballot, when many of the conservative first-ballot 
Duesterberg voters switched to the Nazi leader). 
Table 7:  Some Social Correlates of the 1925 and 1932 Presidential Vote 
Pearson's r (x 100) PR1925B PR1932B 
 Marx Hindenburg Hitler Hindenburg 
% Catholic  37 -65 -68  71 
% Urban  21 -22 -28  00 
% Farming Pop. -26  28  28  01 
% Industry  25 -34 -23 -04 
% Self Employed -18  15  18  12 
% Civil Servants  05  03 -09  06 
% White Collar  21 -20 -29  05 
% Blue Collar -08  11 -28  00 
% Unemployed WC  21 -22 -27 -04 
% Unemployed BC  27 -37 -27 -10 
County data (n=831); cases weighted by population. 
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From the perspective of voter fluctuations, Hindenburg seems to have lost his 
old constituency. He was reinstated in office by his former opponents, the 
followers of the Catholic Center Party, the Social Democrats, and the few re-
maining left-liberals of the DDP/ DStP. 
The social correlates of the vote of the two main contenders of 1925 and 
1933, as displayed in Table 7, reveal the radical rearrangement undergone by 
the Hindenburg voting coalition. In 1925, the Hindenburg vote was lower in 
predominantly Catholic, in urban, industrialized districts, and in regions where 
unemployment was above average. By contrast, the Hindenburg vote of 1932 
increased with the number of Catholics and self-employed in the district. And 
Hitler’s constituency of 1932, like Hindenburg’s of 1925, was located in pre-
dominantly Protestant counties, in rural areas, and in districts with lower than 
average unemployment rates.8 
The information presented in Table 7 is bivariate in character: only two var-
iables are compared at one time. The real world, however, is different: nobody 
is only Catholic or Protestant, only young or old, only farmer or blue-collar 
worker. The same is true for the territorial units which form the basis of the 
analysis: county units are Catholic and rural and predominantly agrarian, etc. 
To account for this mix of social characteristics, one may combine some of the 
most important explanatory properties of the counties in a tree comparison 
(Table 8). In order to construct such a “tree,” we first divide the 831 county 
units of the Reich into three subgroups according to the percentage of Catholics 
living in these counties (religious denomination is by far the most important 
predictor of the Hitler and Hindenburg vote in 1932!). For these three sub-
groups of counties, we calculate the average percentage of Hindenburg, Hitler, 
and Marx voters. In the next step the three denominational county classes are 
then divided according to their degree of urbanization. Again the average per-
centage of Hindenburg, Hitler, and Marx voters is calculated for each of the 
resulting six groups. We thus find, for example, that the Hindenburg vote was 
far below average in rural Catholic areas in 1925 (23 percent); in 1932, howev-
er, Hindenburg was able in these very same counties to mobilize 59 percent of 
the eligible voters, while Adolf Hitler was able to win only 19 percent of the 
electorate in this branch of our tree. 
 
                                                             
8  Quite unexpectedly the Nazis fared much better in districts with low levels of unemploy-
ment. On the average, the unemployed seem to have been clearly underrepresented among 
Nazi voters. See Jürgen W. Falter, “Unemployment and the Radicalisation of the German 
Electorate 1928-1933: An Aggregate Data Analysis with Special Emphasis on the Rise of 
National Socialism,” in Peter Stachura, ed., Unemployment and the Great Depression in 
Weimar Germany (Houndsmill/London, 1986), 187-208, and Jürgen W. Falter, Hitlers Wähler 
(Munich, 1991), 292-314. 
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In the next and final step, the resulting six county classes are again divided into 
three sub-classes each, according to the prevalent economic sector, so that we 
are now looking at 18 different county categories which are socially and politi-
cally more homogeneous than the less differentiated branches of the tree above 
this last level. We then determine the share of the vote in each of the eighteen 
branches for the three main contenders of the two elections under considera-
tion.9 
While space constraints prohibit a detailed description, one can readily see 
from the “tree” that the Hindenburg voting coalition underwent a radical 
change: the distribution of Hindenburg votes in 1932 is much closer to that of 
the Marx vote of 1925 than to the first Hindenburg vote. Likewise, the Hitler 
vote of 1932 closely matches the Hindenburg vote of 1925: in those socially 
defined subgroups where Hindenburg’s showing was strong in 1925, Hitler 
gathered an above-average share of the votes in 1932, and vice versa. From this 
perspective, the conservative and right-wing voter coalition that brought Hin-
denburg into power in the first Weimar presidential election may indeed be 
described as the harbinger of the electoral triumphs of the NSDAP of 1932 and 
1933. It therefore may be interpreted as the first effective gathering of the anti-
republican forces that would later bring the Weimar Republic to an end.10  
4.  Did Indeed Many Thälmann Voters of the First Ballot 
Vote for Hitler in the Second Ballot of the 1932 
Presidential Election? 
It is often suggested that the increase in Hitler’s constituency (about 2 million 
votes) during the second ballot of the 1932 presidential election may have been 
largely due to defections from the Communist leader Ernst Thälmann, who lost 
about 1.2 million votes. This hypothesis, which is based mostly on local im-
pressionistic evidence (the proverbial Communist tavern which changed colors 
overnight), is rooted in the widespread conviction that ultimately the totalitari-
an extremes were not so terribly far apart and that the step from the Com-
munists to the Nazis was much more readily taken than ideology or propaganda 
might lead one to expect. This idea of the proximity of the extremes finds addi-
                                                             
9  Analogous “trees” for all major parties and Weimar elections are presented in Jürgen W. 
Falter et al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik, 194-203. 
10  In fact in the multivariate model the Hindenburg vote of 1925 (which in turn may be inter-
preted as a proximity measure of a right-wing political tradition) is the second best predic-
tor of the Nazi vote (after the religious composition of the counties)! See Jürgen W. Falter 
and Dirk Hänisch, “Die Anfälligkeit von Arbeitern gegenüber der NSDAP bei den Reichstags-
wahlen 1928-1933,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 26 (1986): 179-216, Reprint in this HSR 
Supplement. 
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tional theoretical endorsement in the conviction that many, if not most, of Hit-
ler’s and Thälmann’s followers were unpolitical, socially uprooted products of 
mass society, so-called protest voters who could easily be seduced by unrealis-
tic promises and who therefore fell prey to the totalitarian temptations of the 
time.11 However, little quantitative evidence has ever been provided that would 
either prove or disprove this transition hypothesis. 
In Table 9A, the statistical relationship between the percentage point change 
of the Thälmann and Hitler vote between the first and second ballot of the 1932 
presidential election is scrutinized. Again, quintiles and correlation coefficients 
are examined. In contrast to Tables 2 and 5, however, we are now looking at 
so-called change variables, i.e., percentage-point differences of the vote be-
tween the first and second ballot. What we find is a near-perfect independence 
of the development of the Hitler and Thälmann vote. There is absolutely no 
linear relationship at the county level between the increase of the Hitler con-
stituency and the decrease of the Thälmann electorate. In those 166 counties 
where the increase of the Hitler vote was strongest (9.2 percentage points on 
the average), Thälmann lost only 2.6 percentage points; and in those other 166 
counties where the increase of the Hitler vote was smallest (0.4 percentage 
points), the decline of the Thälmann electorate was about the same as in the 
highest quintile (2.2 percentage points). The correlation coefficient accordingly 
is zero (0.01). Hence, at the (bivariate) aggregate level there is no empirical 
basis for the old Thälmann-to-Hitler transition hypothesis. 
Table 9:  The Transition Behavior of the Thälmann Voters in Regard to 
Hindenburg and Hitler  
Table 9A: Change Variables and Correlation Coefficients at the County Level 
(Bivariate Relationships) 
Change of 1932 Thälmann Vote (Quint.)  1932 Hitler Vote (Quint.)  
 1 2 3 4 5 r 1 2 3 4 5 r 
Hindenburg   2.6   2.2   1.4   0.9   1.5   12   1.5   1.6   1.0   1.2    2.5   11 
Hitler   2.6   5.0   5.3   4.7   4.6   01   0.4   2.7   4.2   5.8    9.2 100 
Thälmann -0.5 -1.2 -1.9 -2.8 -4.8 100 -2.2 -3.4 -3.1 -2.9   -2.6   01 
Duesterberg - - - - - -16 -1.9 -3.3 -4.5 -6.6 -12.7 -83 
Cell entries: percentage point change and Pearson correlation coefficients, county level data. 
Reading example: In those 20% of the counties where (the Communist candidate) Ernst  
Thälmann lost most (=an average of 4.8 percentage points in comparison to the first ballot), 
the Hindenburg vote increased by 1.5 percentage points in the second ballot of the 1932 
presidential elections, etc. 
 
                                                             
11  See Alfred Milatz, Wahlen und Wähler in der Weimarer Republik (Bonn, 1965), 138-9, 141. 
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Table 9B: Ecological Regression Estimates 
 Second Ballot 
Hindenburg Hitler Thälmann Nonvoters 
First Ballot     
Hindenburg 94  2  1  3 
Duesterberg 15 50  7 28 
Hitler  4 96  0  0 
Thälmann  5 13 62 21 
Nonvoters 13  2  3 82 
Cell entries: Transition probabilities, estimated by multiple regression analysis; counties 
weighted by number of eligible voters. 
Reading example: 50 percent of the first ballot Duesterberg supporters voted for Hitler in the 
second ballot of the 1932 presidential election, etc. 
 
If we take into consideration the development of the other candidates, however, 
we get somewhat different results. In a multiple regression analysis of the 
percentage-point change of the Hitler vote, we detect a small but significant 
positive relationship: the increase of the Hitler vote from March to April 1932, 
was somewhat higher where the Thälmann vote was above average in the first 
ballot or declined more strongly from the first to the second ballot, as the 
standardized regression coefficients of the following two equations show: 
DiffHitl = 0.797 % Duesterberg + 0.114 % Thälmann − 0.067 % Hindenburg 
− 0.090 % Nonvoters. 
and, when using change variables on both sides of the equation: 
DiffHitl = −0.941 DiffDuesterberg −0.111 DifïThälmann −0.245 DiffHinden-
burg. 
The ecological regression estimates amount to about 13 percent of former 
Thälmann voters switching to Adolf Hitler in the second ballot (see Table 9B). 
This would imply that almost 30 percent of the new Hitler voters would indeed 
have been former Thälmann followers. Another 20 percent of the Thälmann 
supporters seem to have abstained during the second round of the presidential 
election. But according to the same ecological regression findings, the vast 
majority of the new Hitler voters of April 1932 – about 60 percent – were for-
mer Duesterberg supporters. Again, the voter fluctuation seems to have been 
more complex and differentiated than is normally assumed. If these ecological 
regression estimates are correct, then there were a few hundred thousand first-
round Thälmann voters who joined the ranks of the Hitler coalition. While they 
made up neither a majority of Thälmann defectors nor of new Hitler recruits, 
they are sufficiently numerous to give credence to the local events and personal 
experiences reported in the biographical literature. 
